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The novelty of scientiﬁc or technological knowledge has a paradoxical dual implication. Highly novel
ideas are subject to a higher risk of rejection by their evaluating audiences than incremental, “normal
science” contributions. Yet the same audiences may deem a contribution to knowledge valuable because
it is highly novel. This study develops and tests an explanation of this dual effect. It is argued that the
recognition premium that highly acclaimed authors’work enjoys disproportionately accrues towork that
is consistent with the authors’ previously developed identity. Because high novelty is a salient identity
marker, authors’ past recognition for highly novel work helps same authors’ new highly novel work earn
positive audience valuation. It is further argued that, because recognition for novelty is partly inherited
from mentors, disciples of highly acclaimed producers of novel work are more likely to have their work
prized for its novelty. In contrast, the authors’ or theirmentors’ recognition earned for relatively less novel
work does not trigger similar spillover effects and leaves the authors vulnerable to the novelty discount.
Uniquedataon theproductivity, careerhistories, andmentoring relationsof academicelectrical engineers
support these arguments.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Technologists, scientists, and organizations involved in produc-
tion of new knowledge face a continual predicament. On the one
hand, the evaluating audiences expect each new contribution to
diverge from pre-existing accepted knowledge and view novelty
as a major criterion of merit (Dirk, 1999; Guetzkow et al., 2004). On
the other hand, high novelty may reduce the contribution’s value
in its audience’s eyes. Divergence from existing paradigms subjects
knowledge to skepticism and a higher risk of rejection (Boudreau
et al., 2012; Mueller et al., 2012; Staw, 1995), even in organizations
dedicated to the production of novelty such as product design com-
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panies (Kelley and Littman, 2005) and academic journals (Starbuck,
2003).1
Why is novelty sometimes an advantage and sometimes a
liability?What is required for highly novel knowledge to earn eval-
uating audiences’ recognition rather than neglect or skepticism?
The answers that these questions receive in speciﬁc organizational
settings are consequential. These answers shape the rewards of
knowledge producers’ careers, and thereby the social inequalities
among scientists and technology developers. They are also vital to
the success of entrepreneurs who attempt to commercialize inno-
vative ideas.
Existing scholarship offers some explanations of the dual effect
of novelty on recognition. First, the hypothesis known as Planck’s
principle suggests that younger audiences are relatively open to
divergence from prior knowledge, while older audiences tend to
resist it. Proposed by and named after the originator of quantum
theory, Planck’s principle has been invoked in inﬂuential state-
ments of the noncumulative nature of science (e.g., Feyerabend,
1970; p. 203; Kuhn, 1962; p. 151). Second, differences in the audi-
ences’ valuationofnoveltymaybeattributable to cultural variation.
1 “Originality” is an alternative term referring to divergence from prior knowl-
edge, used in the literature interchangeablywith “novelty” (cf. Boudreau et al., 2012;
Dirk, 1999; Guetzkow et al., 2004; Staw, 1995).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.05.007
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For example, the Oriental tradition has historically valued the
novelty of creative products less than the Western tradition has
(Lubart, 1990; Niu and Sternberg, 2006). Third, novelty encounters
resistance among audiences if its harmful uses become apparent
(Cropley et al., 2010; McLaren, 1993). Fourth, there is experi-
mental evidence that individuals primed to feel uncertainty tend
to reject highly novel outcomes in favor of non-novel outcomes
that have proven practical use (Mueller et al., 2012). Fifth, studies
have attested that audiences are more receptive to highly novel
contributions when the standards of dominant paradigms, in con-
trast to which novelty is deﬁned in the ﬁeld, become ambiguous.
Such crises may occur because of social fragmentation in the ﬁeld
(Sgourev, 2013) or because prominent producers deliberately blur
the standards (Rao et al., 2005).
These arguments have expanded our understanding of the vary-
ing valuation of novelty and ignited further interest in the subject.
Yet they have done little to explain why the same audience, while
simultaneously appraising multiple contributions, values their
novelty differently. Planck’s principle and the cultural explanation
are only suited for explaining variation between audiences; uncer-
tainty and paradigm crises may only explain variation between
different points in time. The harm explanation addresses audience-
and time-speciﬁc variation but its application is limited to the
rare situations in which the harmfulness of knowledge visibly
varies. As a result, these arguments offer little explanatory edge in
typical settings where expert audiences evaluate modern science
or technology, such as when funding agencies consider compet-
ing grant proposals, when investors evaluate competing business
plans, when papers are selected for conference presentation, or
when journal editors decide which contributions should be pub-
lished.
To develop an explanation that avoids these limitations and
applies in typical, everyday practice of innovation appraisal, I build
on two theoretical ideas. First, I draw on the notion that audience
recognition is self-perpetuating – other things being equal, audi-
ences grant more recognition to authors’ outputs to the extent
that the authors are already recognized for their work (Merton,
1968). Second, I revisit the idea that audiences reward producers’
consistency, particularly consistency with the producer’s previ-
ously developed identity (Zuckerman et al., 2003; Hsu andHannan,
2005; Leahey, 2007; White, 2008; Hannan, 2010). I argue that past
recognition does not equally beneﬁt all types of authors’ work;
instead, its rewards disproportionately accrue to contributions that
align with the professional identities that their authors have devel-
oped. Because high novelty is a salient identity marker, recognition
earned for novel work will disproportionally channel the rewards
toward novel work. I further argue that recognition for novelty is
not necessarily earned personally by the authors; authors partly
inherit it from their mentors. Taken together, these ideas predict
that, to the extent that the authors or their mentors have earned
recognition for highly novel work, novelty makes audiences more
likely to grant recognition to the authors’ subsequent work. Con-
versely, if authors or their mentors have a relatively modest record
of acclaimed novel work, the share of the past recognition pre-
mium channeled toward highly novel work will not be sufﬁcient to
compensate for the audiences’ tendency to discount highly novel
contributions.
I examined this argument with specially collected data on the
productivity, career histories, and professional networks of aca-
demic electrical engineers. The analysis supported the predictions.
It showed that the audience recognition earned by engineers or
their mentors for highly novel work transforms the novelty of
the engineers’ subsequent contributions from a liability into an
advantage in the pursuit of further recognition; recognition earned
for less novel work does not accomplish a similar transforma-
tion.
2. Background theory
2.1. Novelty as unusual recombination of antecedent knowledge
Before considering how past recognition moderates the effect
of novelty on the recognition of new knowledge by its audiences,
it is necessary to clarify the concept of novelty. This study follows
the long tradition that conceptualizes novelty as unusual recom-
bination of elements of prior knowledge. Early statement of the
recombinant nature of innovation is typically credited to Schum-
peter, particularly to his work on the business cycles (Schumpeter,
1939). In the recent decades, the conceptualization of novelty as
unusual recombination of antecedents has become standard in the
study of innovation (Fleming, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001;
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Weitzman, 1996). Measures that capture the unusu-
alness of recombination of elements have been used to quantify
novelty and originality in technology (Hall et al., 2001; Dahlin and
Behrens, 2005;Valentini, 2012), science (Boudreauet al., 2012;Uzzi
et al., 2013), and artistic creation (Simonton, 1980a,b).
The history of technology is replete with instances of impact-
ful recombination of disparate knowledge. For example, Millard
(1990) showed how Edison’s innovations routinely recombined
older elements. Notably, the phonograph blended ideas from prod-
ucts developed for the telegraph, telephone, and electric motors.
Hargadon and Sutton (1997) reported 30 remarkable innovations
developed by the product design company IDEO, ranging from
water bottles to computers, each ofwhich is a combination of older
technologies from more than one industry. Thus, the original Apple
computer mouse, a revolutionary early IDEO product, combined
insights from electronics with the trackball design from gaming
machines. More recently, developers of the internet telephony pio-
neer Skype used the peer-to-peer networking software previously
developed for the music sharing application Kazaa, but applied it
to voice transmission instead (Aamoth, 2011).
The recombination view of novelty is particularly apt in
mathematics-intensive ﬁelds, such as information theory exam-
ined in this study. Unless a mathematical contribution introduces
newaxioms, it is entirely derived fromelements of previous knowl-
edge. It may only diverge from previous knowledge by bringing
these familiar elements together in unfamiliar, unusual combina-
tions. As mathematician Henri Poincaré wrote,
the mathematical facts worthy of being studied . . . are those
which reveal to us unsuspected kinship between other facts, long
known, but wrongly believed to be strangers to one another. . . .
[Most combinations] formed of elements drawn from domains
which are far apart . . . would be entirely sterile. But certain among
them, very rare, are the most fruitful of all (Poincaré, 1913; p. 386).
In practice, the judgments of unusualness of recombinations
tend to be domain-speciﬁc rather than absolute. Unless ideas
are impactful enough to attract attention in multiple domains of
knowledge, their novelty is appraised within a single domain; the
audience in the domain deﬁnes the ideas’ unusualness relative to
the knowledge shared in that domain rather than to the entire body
of existing knowledge (Davis, 1971).
2.2. The rewards of past recognition
The outputs of highly recognized producers receive better audi-
ence evaluations. In the context of knowledge production, this
tendency was notably articulated by Merton (1968), who labeled it
the Matthew effect. Researchers have detected a similar tendency
of audiences to overrate the output of prominent producers in
experimental settings (Berger et al., 1972) and in markets of goods
and services (Podolny, 1993, 2005).
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Prominent producers may reap a recognition premium through
two mutually nonexclusive mechanisms. First, the spillover of past
recognition into fresh recognitionbyaudiencesmaybemediatedby
perceptions of producers’ competence. People expect high-status
individuals to be better performers, and the performance expec-
tations translate into better-than-merited evaluations of actual
outputs (Correll and Ridgeway, 2006). Second, the same relation-
ship between past recognition and audience evaluations may be
mediated by resources. As Merton (1968) pointed out, recognition
helps producers attract funding, capable collaborators, and other
resources that enable better work and ease the dissemination of
its results. Whereas the ﬁrst mechanism is purely perceptional
and may be decoupled from actual quality, the second mechanism
improves the quality of the output by acclaimed producers.
2.3. The rewards of consistency
It is telling that “recognition” means appreciation as well as
perceiving tobe familiar.2 The linkbetweenappreciationand famil-
iarity is not just semantic but also empirical—research in various
ﬁeldshas suggested that audiencesvalue contributionsmorehighly
if these contributions are consistent with what the audiences are
already familiar with.
In an argument largely anticipated by Fleck (1935), Kuhn
(1962) insisted that, except in rare periods of paradigm shift, the
recognition of a contribution by a scientiﬁc community critically
depends on whether or not the community views it as consis-
tent with the currently dominant paradigm. Anecdotal examples
(Starbuck, 2003) and quantitative evidence (Boudreau et al., 2012;
Shadish et al., 1995) attest that scientiﬁc audiences indeed reward
alignment with the dominant knowledge canon. Even when the
audiences areopen todivergence fromthe canon, they tend togrant
high recognition to those diverging elements that are grounded
in extremely familiar combinations of prior work (Uzzi et al.,
2013). The notion that audiences reward consistency with famil-
iar cognitive constructs is also prominent in organization studies
and economic sociology. Researchers have found that stock mar-
kets pay a premium for stocks covered by securities analysts who
specialize in stock issuer’s industrial sector category (Zuckerman,
1999); product markets offer better survival chances to new com-
panies that effectively communicate their belonging to a category
of similar aspiring market entrants (Kennedy, 2008); and audi-
ences rewardﬁlms for being consistentwith an existing genre (Hsu,
2006).
While the audiences reward consistency with familiar prior
knowledge, they also reward consistent producer identities. Aca-
demic job markets reward scholars who have developed simple,
easily recognizable identities by specializing in narrow sub-
ﬁelds (Leahey, 2007); specialization in non-academic job markets
brings similar beneﬁts (Zuckerman et al., 2003; Ferguson and
Hasan, 2013). Researchers who consistently collaborate within
academic disciplines outperform those colleagues who dilute
their identity by collaborating across specializations (Birnbaum,
1981). Knowledge-intensive organizations face similar consistency
pressures—actions that are misaligned with established organiza-
tional identities cause the stakeholders to devalue organizations
(Hsu and Hannan, 2005; Hannan, 2010). The notion that consistent
producer identities improve the appraisals of the producers’ out-
put has given rise to common business practices such as corporate
branding (Aaker, 1996; Keller, 2000) and to competitive strate-
gies aimed at defending the ﬁrm’s identity domain (Livengood and
Reger, 2010).
2 Cf. reconnaître in French, erkennen/anerkennen in German, reconocer in Spanish.
The rewards of consistent identities are not unconditional. Evi-
dence from markets of services and cultural goods shows that the
rewards taper off in later stages of producers’ careers (Faulkner,
1983; Zuckerman et al., 2003) and when identity-deﬁning classiﬁ-
cation schemes erode (Hsu et al., 2012; Ruef and Patterson, 2009).
Research has yet to determine whether these contingencies are
paralleled in knowledge production, and how often their impact
is sufﬁcient to cancel out the beneﬁts of maintaining a consistent
professional identity.
3. Hypotheses: The rewards of consistent novelty
The audiences’ dual tendency to prize the outputs of recog-
nized producers and of producers with consistent identities has
a straightforward implication for the question that motivated this
study. Insofar as producing knowledge of consistently high novelty
is a salient identity marker, this tendency implies that recognition
earned for highly novel work helps new highly novel work earn the
recognition of knowledge audiences.
3.1. Recognition for novelty
The ample evidence just reviewed attests that, rather than
appraise contributions solely on merit, the audiences of knowl-
edge take appraisal cues from the author’s previous work. On the
one hand, the audiences offer a recognition premium to contrib-
utions by authorswhoare already recognized for previouswork.On
the other hand, audiences’ recognition disproportionately accrues
to contributions that are consistent with the authors’ professional
identity. When the same audience enacts both of these appraisal
logics, the extra recognition that the Matthew effect brings to
authors is not distributed evenly across their subsequent contrib-
utions but is rather disproportionately channeled to work that is
consistent with what the authors earned the recognition for.
Knowledge producers’ professional identities are usually
deﬁned in terms of the area or topic to which they have con-
tributed. Yet consistently high novelty is also a feature that deﬁnes
knowledge producers’ identities. Research disciplines develop tacit
but widely shared criteria of novelty, and academic audiences
view commitment to novelty as a deﬁning feature of the author’s
personal character (Guetzkow et al., 2004). A consistent record
of producing novel, seminal work makes authors highly visible
in scientiﬁc and technological ﬁelds (Simonton, 1994). Academic
training and everyday research practice routinely expose scientists
and technologists to exemplars of work by such visible innovators
(Latour and Woolgar, 1979).
To the extent that knowledge producer’s identity is deﬁned by
the consistent novelty of their work, their highly novel work bene-
ﬁts fromtheMattheweffectmore than their lessnovelwork. That is,
recognition earned for highly novelworkdisproportionately boosts
the recognition of the author’s highly novel later contributions, as
compared to less novel ones. Therefore, I hypothesize that
H1. The effect of novelty of new contributions to knowledge on
their recognition by the audience ismore positive to the extent that
their authors have previously received recognition for highly novel
work.
Importantly, the logic of the argument implies that recognition
earned for relatively lessnovelwork isnotdisproportionately chan-
neled toward highly novel subsequent work. I therefore do not
expect recognition of this sort, or high recognition in general, to
bring authors a premium for novelty. It is only the speciﬁc kind of
recognition that is earned for highly novel work that is predicted
to do so.
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3.2. Recognition for novelty inherited from mentors
Producers’ activities earn them only part of their esteem. The
other, signiﬁcant part is an extension of the esteem enjoyed by
their associates (Podolny, 1993, 2005). For academic scientists,
a highly visible association that shapes audience appraisals and
career outcomes is that with mentors (Collins, 1998; Malmgren
et al., 2010 Zuckerman, 1977). Academics are keenly aware of
mentoring relations, and the names of academic mentors become
students’ salient, career-long identity markers. In mathematics
and related disciplines, including the sub-discipline of informa-
tion theory examined in this study, the Mathematics Genealogy
Project (genealogy.math.ndsu.nodak.edu) embodies this salience.
The ambition of the project, run in association with the American
Mathematical Society, is to record and publish all mentor-student
lineages.
Insofar as the appraising audiences perceive the authors in con-
junction with their mentors, the authors inherit the recognition
premium that their mentors receive for highly novel work. I there-
fore predict that
H2. The effect of novelty of new contributions to knowledge on
their recognition by the audience is more positive to the extent
that their authors’ mentors have previously received recognition
for highly novel work.
Co-authorship is another visible association in knowledge pro-
duction. However, I do not expect recognition for novelty to spill
over to co-authors in the same way as they spill over from mentors
to protégés. While being trained by someone acclaimed for novel
work may signal that the author has acquired the penchant and the
skills needed to produce novel work, co-authoring with such per-
son may also create the opposite signal that it is that person who
deserves the credit for novelty.
4. The empirical setting
To examine the hypotheses, I compiled a comprehensive
databaseof the creative output ofU.S. academic electrical engineers
specializing in information theory.
Information theory is a sub-ﬁeld of electrical engineering
concernedwith themathematical representationof storedor trans-
mitted information. Theﬁeldwas launched almost single-handedly
by Claude Shannon in 1948. Among other seminal contributions,
Shannon (1948) introduced the term bit to quantify information
and developed the notions of information entropy, information
redundancy, and channel capacity. Since then, information the-
ory has developed a distinct identity and expanded institutionally.
The ﬁeld’s main professional organization, established in 1951,
sponsors multiple conferences and workshops and distributes
prestigious professional awards. Its monthly ﬂagship journal, now
named IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, has been published
since 1953. Today, information theory has extensive commercial
applications, notably in Internet technologies, wireless communi-
cation, and sound and image processing.
The empirical setting of information theory allows the collec-
tion of relevant, high-quality data. Thewell-developed identity and
organization of the ﬁeld help clearly demarcate the community of
information theorists. The size of the ﬁeld enables the collection of
systematic bibliographic data, a task that requires complex, often
manual disambiguation of author identities; it also makes man-
ual coding of the author’s demographic information a manageable
task. The technological relevance of information theory allows the
tracing of the practical applicability of contributions with patent
data. The mathematical nature of the discipline creates a further
methodological advantage. Because accuracy, veriﬁed in the review
process, is a necessary condition for publication of mathematical
results, it is nearly invariable among published results in informa-
tion theory. When accuracy varies, it is an important criterion of
quality that determines the recognition of novel work; the omis-
sion of the accuracy variable (almost inevitable because accuracy
is hard to quantify) may then bias statistical models of recognition,
particularly if highly novel work tends to be less accurate. By using
data from information theory, the accuracy variable is effectively
controlled and this concern minimized.
5. Sample
The initial sample of 343 information theory faculty includes all
individuals who (1) were employed, as of June 2010, as tenured
or tenure-track professors in electrical engineering units (either
independent departments or combined with other areas, typi-
cally computer science) in one of the 96 U.S. institutions classiﬁed
as “very high research activity” in the Carnegie Classiﬁcation of
Institutions of Higher Education; and (2) had published in IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory or listed information theory as
a ﬁeld of interest on personal Web sites. The ProQuest Disserta-
tions and Theses database was then used to expand the sample
of information theorists. The names of initial sample members’
Ph.D. advisers, advisees, and advisers’ advisees were added, bring-
ing the total number of individuals deﬁned as information theorists
to 4029.
Records of publications authored or co-authored by individuals
in the sample were obtained from the Thomson Reuters Web of
Knowledge (TRWK). Publications were matched to authors by the
last name and all initials. If TRWK contained no publications under
the individual’s name in any of the six Web of Science subject cat-
egories in which information theory publications most commonly
appear, no publications were matched to this name.3
A disambiguation algorithmwas then applied to detect ambigu-
ous author names. The algorithm, detailed in Appendix A, is
conservative. It is designed to retain in the sample only those
publications whose authors’ identity is unambiguous. The algo-
rithm ﬂags a name as ambiguous if there is a risk that publications
by someone other than the person in question were matched
to this name. The risks fall into three types: common names,
unrealistic timing of publications, and unrealistic clustering of pub-
lications. Publications with at least one ambiguous author name
were removed from the sample. Editorials, reviews, letters, and
response papers were also removed. The resulting sample con-
tained 19,918 publications authored by 1946 individuals. Amanual
check with a 1% random subsample of the disambiguated pub-
lications showed that 98.5% of the publications were correctly
attributed to authors.
6. Measures
Because the dependent variable and the criteria of novelty are
time-varying, the data are organized as a set of publication-years:
the variables have values for each year between the year of pub-
lication and the end of the observation period. A publication-year
(not to be confused with the year of publication) enters the data
set once for each author, with respective author-level variable val-
ues. Table 1 reports the correlation matrix and shows the mean,
standard deviation, and sources of data for each variable.
3 The six most common Web of Science subject categories in which information
theory publications appear are “Engineering, electrical & electronic”; “Telecommu-
nications”; “Computer science”; “Information systems”; P¨hysics,multidisciplinary”;
“Optics”; and “Artiﬁcial intelligence automation and control systems”.
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6.1. Dependent variable
Academic work gets cited overwhelmingly because citers rec-
ognize its usefulness rather than deﬁciencies (Shadish et al., 1995;
Case and Higgins, 2000). The count of citations that a publica-
tion received within a year thus reﬂects the yearly increment in
audience recognition. This count is the dependent variable in the
analysis. In all analyses reportedbelow, thevariable lags threeyears
behind the predictor variables. The three-year lag is a realistic esti-
mate of the time between the perception of these factors by the
citers and the appearance of the citation in print.4
The latest dependent variable values date from 2009. Because
of the time lag, the latest year of publication in the analysis is 2006.
The exclusion of post-2006 publications reduced the number of
publications in the analysis from 19,918 to 15,373.
6.2. Publication novelty
Scholars have suggested a number of recombination-based
measures of novelty and originality, tailored to capture the unusu-
alness of element combinations in particular settings at hand
(Simonton, 1980a,b; Hall et al., 2001; Boudreau et al., 2012;
Valentini, 2012; Uzzi et al., 2013). I adopt themeasure of novelty by
Dahlin and Behrens (2005), tailored to capture the unusualness of
knowledge recombination in publications that reference anteced-
ing knowledge, such as patents and research papers. It quantiﬁes
how unusual the combinations of the referenced elements of
knowledge in the focal publicationareamong thepre-existing com-
binations in its knowledgedomain. For eachpublication i, I consider
its pairings with every prior publication j written by authors who
ﬁt the deﬁnition of the information theorist on p. 11 above. The
overlap score osij is then deﬁned as the count of documents cited
by both i and j, divided by the sum of unique citations in i or j.
To capture how usual the combination of knowledge in i was rel-
ative to prior combinations in the domain, osij is summed over all
publications j and divided by the count of j. Finally, to convert the
variable of usualness into that of unusualness, the scale is reversed
by subtracting every variable value from themaximum in the given
publication year.
The resulting combination-basedmeasure of noveltymay range
between 0 and 1. In my data, it ranges between 0 and 0.25. The low
extremerepresentspublications that only citedocuments thathave
beenmost frequently cited in priorwork. Such publications recom-
bine only the anteceding elements of knowledge that have been
most usually, routinely recombined in the ﬁeld. The high extreme
of the measure represents publications that only cite antecedents
that have never before been cited by their authors’ professional
peers. This indicates that the publication recombines knowledge
elements in a way that is unique in the ﬁeld.
To examine the validity of the novelty measure, I hired three
advanced doctoral students in information theory at a leading
research university, all with multiple publications in top journals
in the ﬁeld. The doctoral students independently rated the novelty
of the articles that they had cited in their published work. For com-
parison with the scores on the 4-point ordinal scale that the raters
used, the novelty variable was recoded into quartile categories.5
4 IEEE Publishing Operations, the publisher of the journals that information the-
orists typically target, informed me that the median time between manuscript
submission and publication in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory is stably close
to 17 months. This is typical for IEEE research journals. The 3-year lag allows for the
additional 19months that it takes the citers to absorb the information from the cited
publication, craft the manuscript, and make unsuccessful publication attempts.
5 The raters received the following instructions: Think about two types of papers.
Papers of Type 1 are closely related to the preceding work in the ﬁeld and continue
this work. Papers of Type 2 diverge from the preceding work in the ﬁeld; ideas in
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Weighted Cohen’s kappa, a measure of agreement of the raters’
combined scores with the recoded novelty variable, was 0.50 (the
raters’ individual kappas were 0.53, 0.50, and 0.43). This value falls
short of the 0.75 threshold of “excellent agreement” but is above
the 0.40 acceptability threshold (Fleiss et al., 2003; p. 609), showing
that the variable is consistent with the raters’ concept of novelty.
This or other possible validity checks certainly do not remove
the inevitable limitations of themeasure. For example, themeasure
assigns equalweight to all combinations of cited antecedents,with-
out accounting for the fact that some antecedents have impacted
the citing publication more than others. (Thus, Dahlin and Behrens,
2005 have had a disproportionate impact on this study by develop-
ing its novelty measure.) Such limitations of measures of novelty
computed with systematic, longitudinal quantitative data must be
weighed against the advantages of using such data.
6.3. Recognition for novelty
An author’s recognition for previous high-novelty work is mea-
sured as the citation count of his or her publications (other than the
focal publication) that had a novelty score above the yearly sam-
ple median. The count is computed similarly for the Ph.D. advisers
of the author of the focal publication and averaged if the author
had multiple advisers. Both citation counts are cumulative, reﬂect-
ing the notion that recognition at a given time is the total of past
instances of recognition. I also computed the total cumulative cita-
tion count and the cumulative citation count of publications of
below-median novelty, for the authors and for their advisers. All
citation count variables had a strong positive skew. They were
logged in the regression models to reduce the skew.
6.4. Control variables
To ensure the robustness of the models in estimating the effect
ofpast recognitionon the recognitionofnovel contributions, a setof
publication-level and author-level control variables was included.
First, I control for three social status markers. Gender and the top
rank of the author’s degree-granting institution are salient social
statusmarkers that affect the audiences’ valuation of authors’ work
(Cohen and Zhou, 1991; Sauer et al., 2010). The gender of 233
authors (collectively authoring 523 publications) was impossible
to determine.When department rankingswere published at longer
intervals than one year, the rank closest to the Ph.D. conferral year
was used. Employment at a top institution is also a sign of academic
status. Because institutional afﬁliation cannot be reliably matched
to authors in TRWK, I included a dummy that marks publications
authored by members of the original sample of 343 information
theory faculty, all of whom had by 2010 attained employment at
top research institutions. Second, the count of co-authorship and
adviser-advisee ties (degree centrality) captures the involvement
in the network of academic peers; it is a factor that may potentially
affect the authors’ recognition. The measure considers all ties ever
created prior to the focal year. Third, I control for two types of time
dependence. The full set of year dummies controls for any varia-
tion resulting from speciﬁcs of the calendar year. The age of the
publication accounts for the effect of the time that elapsed since its
appearance in print. Because citations tend to peak and then drop, I
also include the quadratic termof the publication age. Fourth, I con-
trol for the number of times each publication was cited in patents.
This variable captures the technological feasibility of the publica-
tion’s ideas, an important reason why audiences prize or discount
them are novel and distantly related to the preceding work. Please give each paper
that you cited a score as follows: 1 –This is clearly a Type1paper; 2 – This is probably
a Type 1 paper; 3 – This is probably a Type 2 paper; 4 – This is clearly a Type 2 paper.
novelty (Boudreau et al., 2012). Fifth, I included a count of publica-
tion co-authors, to account for the citation premiumof co-authored
work (Wuchty et al., 2007). Sixth, a publication-level dummy indi-
cator controls for being published in the ﬁeld’s main journal, IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory. Omission of this variable may
bias themodels because it is amajor predictor of the citation count;
it is alsonegatively correlatedwithnovelty, consistentwith the ten-
dency of leading journals to avoid highly novel work (Siler et al.,
2015). Seventh, to correct the models for possible heterogeneity
across subﬁelds, I include the full set of Web of Science subject area
dummies.
7. Model
The Poisson regression, a standard model for dependent count
variables, assumes that the variance of the dependent variable is
equal to its mean. The dispersion of the citation count variable
greatly exceeds this threshold, and the Poisson regression ﬁts the
data poorly. Therefore, I used the negative binomial regression
model, which is not sensitive to over-dispersion. The Vuong test
did not signiﬁcantly favor the negative binomial model corrected
for zero inﬂation over the noncorrected model.
The p values of the model coefﬁcients may potentially be
inﬂated because of two types of interdependence. First, publica-
tions authored by the same person may violate the assumption of
independence. Second, interdependencemayexist amongrepeated
observations for the same publication. The standard errors in all
models reported below were therefore corrected for author-level
andpublication-level clustering.Clusteringonmultipledimensions
yields reliably unbiased standard errors (Petersen, 2009). Because
major statistical packages do not implement correction for clus-
tering on more than one dimension, I wrote a Stata ado-ﬁle that
corrects negative binomial model estimates for clustering on two
dimensions.6
8. Results
8.1. The effect of authors’ and their mentors’ recognition within
and across subject areas
Hypotheses 1 and 2 hinge on the idea that the spillover of recog-
nition from the author’s or her mentors’ past work to her new
contribution is more extensive if that past work and the new con-
tribution are of the same identity-deﬁning type. Before proceeding
to test the hypotheses, I will examine this underlying idea with a
typology of knowledge that is familiar to the practitioners in the
ﬁeld and is commonly used in bibliometric research.
Fig. 1 plots the yearly citation increments of the publications
in the dataset as a linear function of their authors’ and authors’
doctoral advisers’ cumulative past citations. The plot distinguishes
the increments received for work in the same Web of Science sub-
ject area as the focal publication and those received for work in
a different subject area. For every standard-deviation increase in
the author’s cumulative citation count within the subject area, a
given publication received an increment of 0.18 citations per year
(p<0.001). Citations outside the focal publication’s subject areahad
no such effect; in fact, they non-signiﬁcantly lowered the yearly
6 The Stata code that implements correction for clustering on two dimensions
in linear and logit models is available at www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/
petersen/htm/papers/se/se programming.htm. Using multiple ﬁxed effects is an
alternative to such correction; it also yields unbiased estimates, but only if the effect
of one dimension is constant across the levels of the other (Petersen, 2009). In this
analysis, negative binomial models with ﬁxed author and publication effects fail to
converge.
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Fig. 1. The yearly citation increment of a publication as a linear function of authors’
and their advisers’ total citation count. The 95% conﬁdence intervals, adjusted for
publication-level clustering, are denoted by dashed lines (solid when overlapping).
One author is randomly selected for multiple-authored publications.
citation increment. Theeffects ofwithin-areaandoutside-area cita-
tions are statistically different, as suggested by the non-overlap of
the conﬁdence intervals and conﬁrmed by the Wald test (F=19.57,
p<0.001). Authors’ within-area citations thus earn signiﬁcantly
more newcitations to their later publications than across-area cita-
tions. The ordering of the effect sizes is the same for adviser’s
citations—the effect of within-area citations is larger—albeit the
two effects are statistically non-distinguishable from each other
or from zero.
Without testing the study’s hypotheses, this simple comparison
demonstrates their underlying logic. It shows that past recognition,
at least the portion earned by the author rather than inherited from
the mentors, better helps a publication get cited if it was earned
for work that is similar to that publication. I will now examine, in
greater detail, if the same holds true when the similarity of publi-
cations is deﬁned by their degree of novelty rather than by the area
of knowledge to which they jointly belong.
8.2. The effect of author’s and their mentors’ recognition for
novelty
Table 2 reports the results of negative binomial models of
the citation count. The models test the hypotheses by examin-
ing the interaction effects of publication novelty with indicators
of the authors’ and their academic mentors’ recognition for nov-
elty. Model 1 is the baseline model that includes only the control
variables and the novelty variable. The control variables show no
unexpected effects. In the absence of the recognition variables,
there is no signiﬁcant relationship between novelty and the publi-
cation’s yearly citation count. Models 2 and 3 examine the effects
of the author’s total citation count. The positive and signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient of the citation count in Model 2 is consistent with the
Matthew effect—it shows that better cited scholars are more likely
to have their fresh work cited by peers. In Model 3, I added the
interaction termbetween publication novelty and the total citation
count. Unlike the main effect, the interaction effect is not signiﬁ-
cant, attesting that citers do not prize novelty in the work of better
cited authors above novelty in the work of less cited ones.
Hypothesis 1 is tested in Model 4. In this model, I split the indi-
vidual citations into those earned for work of higher (above sample
median) and lower novelty. The contrast between the effects of
these two components of the citation count is telling. The effect
of the interaction between the novelty of the publication and the
citation count of its author’s previous novel work is positive and
Fig. 2. The marginal effect of publications’ novelty on citation count as recognition
for novelty varies. The gray lines show 95% conﬁdence intervals. The marginal effect
lines are thicker where zero is outside the interval.
signiﬁcant. Thus, as predicted in Hypothesis 1, novelty helps pub-
lications get cited to the extent that their authors are already
recognized for novel work. In contrast, the negative and signiﬁ-
cant interaction effect of citations received for lower-novelty work
indicates that such citationsmake novelty a hindrance to attracting
citations to subsequentwork. They do, however, attract citations to
publications of lower novelty, as evidenced by the main effect.
Models 5–7 replicate the analysis in Models 2–4, substituting
Ph.D. advisers’ recognition variables for those of the authors. The
total citation count of the author’s adviser, unlike the author’s own
citation count, is not signiﬁcantly related to the publication’s yearly
citation increment. The other results in this set of models parallel
the ﬁndings for the authors’ recognition. The interaction effect in
Model 6 shows that having a highly cited mentor does not make
novelty a signiﬁcant citation-boosting factor. The effect of the inter-
actionbetween thenovelty of thenewcontribution and the citation
count of the mentor’s previous higher-novelty work in Model 7 is
positive and signiﬁcant. This result supports Hypothesis 2. Again,
we ﬁnd that past recognition—in this case, the part of it inherited
from the mentor—helps authors attain more audience recognition
for novelty if earned for higher-novelty work.
Hypothesis 2was testedwith fewer cases thanHypothesis 1 due
to the omission of recordswithmissing or ambiguous adviser infor-
mation. Because the adviser records in the ProQuest Dissertations
and Theses database become less complete as they go back in time,
adviser information was typically less available for older, better-
published authors. Omitting the authors whose adviser identity
was missing or ambiguous therefore led to a disproportionate
decrease in the sample of publication-years. One consequence of
such listwise deletion is that almost 68% of the valid values of the
author’s recognition variables are excluded from Model 8, the full
model with the authors’ as well as the advisers’ recognition effects.
Despite being estimated with a different sample, much smaller and
non-randomly selected, the full model reproduces the results sup-
porting Hypothesis 1.
While publication novelty was unrelated to publication’s yearly
citation increment in the base model (Model 1), the main effect
of novelty was signiﬁcantly negative in the models with inter-
action terms which tested the hypotheses (Models 4, 7, and 8).
This indicates that novelty inhibits the citation of publications by
authorswho lack recognition for previousworkor by these authors’
advisees; such publications have a better prospect of getting cited
if they are relatively less novel.
Fig. 2 offers a more nuanced representation of the hypothesized
effects. The ﬁgure plots the marginal effect of publications’ novelty
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Table 2
Effects of novelty and recognition on yearly citation counts of information theory publications.
Negative binomial models of citation count in year t+3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 (full)
Author-level control variables
Female 0.023 0.090 0.089 0.037 0.077 0.077 0.118 0.086
(0.111) (0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.133) (0.133) (0.142) (0.119)
Top-5 Ph.D. department 0.471** 0.512** 0.512** 0.455** 0.391** 0.393** 0.463** 0.467**
(0.076) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.107) (0.106) (0.100) (0.097)
Information theory faculty 0.095 0.003 0.004 0.014 0.140 0.140 0.112 0.032
(0.060) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.136) (0.136) (0.139) (0.135)
Degree centrality >−0.001 −0.001** −0.001** −0.001** <0.001 <0.001 0.001 −0.001
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Publication-level control variables
Publication age −0.053** −0.076** −0.073** −0.072** −0.050** −0.051** −0.055** −0.082**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
(Publication age)2 >−0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 >−0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Citations in patents 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Number of authors 0.016 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.012
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
IEEE TIT publication 1.204** 1.186** 1.186** 1.122** 1.331** 1.331** 1.324** 1.218**
(0.130) (0.131) (0.130) (0.126) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.172)
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject category dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Publication novelty −0.13 −0.22 −2.93 −18.89** −131.31** −116.68* −117.99** −131.07**
(2.36) (2.33) (1.97) (4.24) (12.42) (56.38) (38.36) (30.52)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 (full)
Recognition variables (logged) Author variables (Models 2–4) Adviser variables (Models 5–7) Author Adviser
Total citation count 0.10** 0.10** 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Citation count of higher-novelty work −0.06** −0.11** −0.06* −0.10**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Citation count of lower-novelty work 0.17** 0.16** 0.22** 0.10**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Interaction with recognition variables: novelty × . . .
Total citation count 0.59 −2.48
(0.66) (8.26)
Citation count of higher-novelty work 6.68** 11.21* 10.58** 11.88*
(1.62) (5.49) (3.94) (5.56)
Citation count of lower-novelty work −6.37** −16.36* −20.29** −6.86
(1.33) (6.36) (4.21) (5.87)
Yearly observations 140,940 140,940 140,940 140,940 44,595 44,595 44,595 44,595
Publications 13,578 13,578 13,578 13,578 6360 6360 6360 6360
Authors 1553 1553 1553 1553 1042 1042 1042 1042
Log likelihood −250,553 −230,100 −230,094 −229,468 −75,855 −75,854 −75,694 −75,329
Note: The constants are omitted. Standard errors, adjusted for author-level and publication-level clustering, are in parentheses. The data set includes publications authored or
co-authored by individuals employed, as of June 2010, as information theory faculty at U.S. institutions classiﬁed as “very high research activity” in the Carnegie Classiﬁcation
of Institutions of Higher Education, their Ph.D. students, Ph.D. advisers, and advisers’ Ph.D. students. The count of observations reﬂects listwise deletion.
* p<0.05.
** p<0.01.
on their lagged yearly citation count across the full range of the
two higher-novelty citation count variables, calculated for models
with the respective interaction terms (Models 4 and 7). This simul-
taneously visualizes the sign and the magnitude of the variables’
moderating effects. To show the two variables on one horizon-
tal axis, their scales were standardized by converting the original
values into percentile categories.
Both moderating variables cause marked variation in the
marginal effect of a publication’s novelty. Novelty signiﬁcantly
lowered the number of citations that publications received if
the citation count of their authors’ higher-novelty work was
below the 27th percentile; but novelty earned a signiﬁcant cita-
tion increment if it was above the 42nd percentile. The plot
makes it clear that the effect of novelty on the citation count
switches from negative to positive as the author’s recognition
for novel work increases. The author’s recognition for novelty
thus not only counteracts the novelty aversion but is also capa-
ble of transforming the novelty of a contribution from a liability
into an advantage that helps in attaining the audience’s recogni-
tion.
Ph.D. adviser’s recognition for novelty similarly improves the
chances that an authors’ work will be valued for its novelty. How-
ever, the effect of adviser’s recognition is not pronounced enough
to transform novelty from a liability into an advantage. Advisers’
citation count for higher-novelty work only prevents novelty from
being a signiﬁcant impediment to citations when it is above the
33rd percentile; yet novelty brings a negative citation increment
even at the highest values of adviser’s recognition for novelty.
9. Robustness checks
9.1. Alternative model speciﬁcations
It stands to reason that the degree to which the audience
associates authors with their Ph.D. advisers’ work decays with
time. If so, the effect of the context of the mentor is more
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precisely captured if the recognition variables are adjusted for
time decay. I adjusted the mentor recognition variables for a
5% yearly decay, multiplying each post-Ph.D. variable value by
0.95(focalyear− author′sPh.D.attainmentyear). Neither the 5% nor the 10%
yearly decay adjustment changed the sign or signiﬁcance of the
variables’ effects. Nor did those change when the models were re-
estimated with non-logged citation counts. Further, I tried using
above-median thresholds of novelty in the calculation of the recog-
nition variables, raising the threshold to the top quintile, and again
to the top decile. I re-estimated all reported models with differ-
ent time lags between the dependent variable and the predictors,
trying 2-, 4-, and 5-year lags. I also re-estimated Models 4 and 7
without the interaction term for the citation count of lower-novelty
work. The hypothesized effects persisted in all these speciﬁca-
tions.
Next, I considered the results’ sensitivity to multiple author-
ship. When a publication has more than one author, its citation
count may be inﬂuenced by the identity of the focal author
and of other authors. Co-author’s recognition may have mufﬂed
the recognition effects of the focal authors that were hypothe-
sized and observed or, alternatively, biased them in a way that
led to false acceptance of the hypotheses. The former alterna-
tive would improve the rigor of the tests: if the focal authors’
effect is detectable even despite the noise from the co-authors,
this testiﬁes to the robustness of this effect. To rule out the sec-
ond alternative, I re-estimated all models in the subsample of
single-authored publications and again in the subsample of co-
authored ones. The hypothesized effects were reproduced in both
subsamples. Furthermore, I re-estimated all models with the sub-
sample of co-authored publications adding, to each recognition
variable, the same variable averaged across the focal author’s
co-authors. Thehypothesized effect of the author’s recognitionper-
sisted, although 81.7% of the observations were lost because the
information on co-authors’ citation count or novelty was missing.
The loss of observations was too large for the negative binomial
models testing the effects of the adviser’s recognition to con-
verge.
This study shares the sample selectionproblem inherent inmost
quantitative analyses of the success of creativework. Such analyses
can only examine creative products that are successful enough to
enter the dataset but cannot account for the processes that pre-
vent other products from achieving that minimal success. Thus,
the analysis in this article could only consider published work
rather than the process by which novel work does or does not
get published in the ﬁrst place. I checked the robustness of the
results to sample selection in twoways. First, the inverseMills ratio
(Heckman, 1979) was entered in all regression models. The inverse
Mills ratio is the hazard of non-selection predicted by variables
that correlate with the selection variable—in this case, with the
dummy indicator of having no publications. All hypothesis-testing
effects persisted in the models with the Mills ratio. Second, I reran
the models on a subsample of authors who have survived at least
10 years in the data. These authors are relatively less affected by
selection in the publication process because it is easier for them
to get their output into print due to Matthew-like effects and to
better knowledge of the publication opportunities. All the hypoth-
esized effects retained their size and direction in the subsample.
The standard errors increased because of the loss of observations
and, as a result, the statistical signiﬁcance of the interaction effect
that tested H2 became borderline: it was signiﬁcant at p=0.078 in
Model 7 and at p=0.107 in the full Model 8. When all other inter-
action effects were removed from the model, it was signiﬁcant at
p=0.081.
All results of alternative regression speciﬁcations are available
on request.
9.2. An alternative test design: Constant quality and recognition
shocks
The effects of producers’ recognition may be confounded by the
objective quality of their work. This problem is endemic to empiri-
cal analyses of reputational effects (Simcoe andWaguespack, 2011;
Azoulay et al., 2014), and this analysis is no exception. To the
extent that the controls for quality in the models are imperfect,
the authors’ recognition for novelty, either earnedor inherited from
thementors,may correlatewith citations because the high-novelty
output of these authors or theirmentors is objectively better, rather
thanbecauseof audience recognition. Individualﬁxedeffectsdonot
resolve this problem because individuals’ recognition and quality
vary with time.
To net out the effect of product quality and detect the effect
of the recognition for higher-novelty work, the study design must
capture variation in the recognition of the products by the audience
that is guaranteed to not be confounded by the variation in those
products’ actual quality. One way to accomplish this is to exam-
ine an exogenous recognition shock, such as receiving a prominent
professional award, and its effect on the appraisal of a product that
was created before the shock. Because the objective quality of each
product is constant in this design, a change in its appraisal by the
audience in the wake of the shock can be triggered by a change
in producers’ recognition but not by a concomitant change in the
product’s actual quality (Azoulay et al., 2014).
I examined the effect of the Shannon Award and the IEEE fel-
lowship, two major professional accolades awarded for long-term
work in information theory. The Shannon Award is given to one
person annually by the IEEE Information Theory Society “to honor
consistent and profound contributions to the ﬁeld of information
theory.” The status of IEEE Fellow is conferred annually upon indi-
viduals with “an extraordinary record of accomplishments in any
of the IEEE ﬁelds of interest.”7 The sample contains publications by
seven Shannon Award recipients and 125 IEEE Fellows.
Because professional awards simultaneously boost the recipi-
ents’ peer recognition and highlight the nature of their prior work,
the hypotheses predict that, among the awardees whose prior
work is highly novel, the relationship between the novelty and
the citation rate of contributions that they published before the
award will become more positive after the award (and after a
delay required for the effect of the award to diffuse). They pre-
dict no similar upturn in this relationship if the awardee’s prior
work is not highly novel. To operationalize these predictions, nov-
elty N of author a’s work prior to award year y was deﬁned as the
weighted average novelty of the author’s past publications, Nay=∑
p
Np × Cp(y−1)/(P(y−1) ×
∑
p
Cp(y−1)), where p indexes the publica-
tions by author a, P is a’s publication count, and C is the citation
count of p. The weighting ensures that a publication’s contribution
to this aggregate measure is proportional to its citation count.
I traced the pre- and post-award temporal trend in the correla-
tion between publications’ novelty and their yearly citation count,
separately for publications authored by awardees whose Nay was
above and below the median.8 As shown in Fig. 3, the correlation
between the novelty and the yearly citation increment of pre-
award publications is stably negative for those awardees whose
pre-award work was relatively less novel; the award event has
no visible impact on this correlation. In contrast, the correlation
7 The award criteria are posted at www.itsoc.org/honors/claude-e-shannon-
award and www.ieee.org/membership services/membership/fellows.
8 Note that, in this analysis, Nay varies not only between individuals but also
between publications because the focal publication’s novelty is omitted from the
calculation.
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Fig. 3. Correlation between the novelty and yearly citation count of pre-award publications among award recipients and their advisees, by novelty of their pre-award
published work. The awards are the Shannon Award and IEEE fellowship. The averages are weighted by publications’ total citation count. The correlation coefﬁcients are
computed in a three-year moving time frame. The gray lines show 95% conﬁdence intervals; the lines are thicker where zero is outside the interval.
among those whose pre-award work was above median novelty
spikes after the award, reaching positive and signiﬁcant values in
the third post-award year and, after a slight dip, again after the
eighth year. I reproduced the same plot for publications by award
recipients’ advisees. The advisees’ two lines run roughly parallel,
until the higher-novelty line dips and then surges upward in years
seven to ten after the adviser’s award. Even though this upsurge
does not make the correlation coefﬁcient signiﬁcant, it is sufﬁ-
cient to make the positive coefﬁcient for higher novelty and the
negative coefﬁcient for lower novelty statistically different from
each other at p=0.05 in years nine and ten. A comparison of the
slopes instead of the correlation coefﬁcients yielded substantively
the same results, showing the expected post-award upturns among
the awardees whose prior work was of above-median novelty and
none among the other awardees.
This demonstration of recognition effects in a constant-quality
test design does not guarantee that the quality mechanisms had no
role in producing the results reported earlier. Yet the ﬁnding that
the relationship between the novelty and the recognition of pub-
lications that predate recognition shocks becomes more positive
after these shocks attests that the recognition mechanism opera-
tes in the empirical setting at hand. The two hypotheses of this
study were premised on the presence of the recognition spillover
mechanism, not on the irrelevance of the quality mechanism.
10. Discussion
10.1. Contributions
This project was motivated by the puzzling dual implication of
novelty for the recognition of knowledge. Novel, unusual recombi-
nations of knowledgemay be subject to a higher risk of rejection by
evaluating audiences. Yet audiences may also deem a contribution
valuable precisely because it is highly novel. I argued that the latter
outcome becomes more likely when the authors of knowledge or
their mentors have established a record of recognized novel work.
The empirical results supported the argument: indeed, highlynovel
publications receivedmore citations to theextent that their authors
or authors’ mentors were already recognized for novel work.
This study contributes to creativity and innovation research by
expanding the scope of the existing explanations of the audiences’
alternately favorable and dismissive appraisals of novelty. Previ-
ously suggested explanations accounted for the variation in the
appraisal of novelty between audiences or between time periods.
In contrast, the explanation offered here aspired to explainwhy the
same audience, while simultaneously appraising multiple contrib-
utions, may value their novelty differently.
This study tellingly supplements the existing arguments about
the role of social status in the recognition of creative work. The
research that documented Matthew-like effects in various creative
activities (e.g., Burton et al., 2002; Higgins et al., 2011 Zuckerman,
1977) has been silent on whether high-status actors’ recognition
premium helps transform novelty from a liability into an advan-
tage. An afﬁrmative answer to this question is now emerging in
studies on artistic creativity. Sgourev and Althuizen (2014) sug-
gested that artists’ high status activates the audiences’ perception
of their creative competence—that is, a capability to do work
that is both highly novel and of high quality. This perception, in
turn, predisposes the audiences to appreciate high-status artists’
stylistic novelty. Koppman (2014) presents a similar mediation
mechanism, in which the positive relationship between a person’s
high-status background and successful entrance into a creative
career is mediated by cultural capital, which signals the person’s
creative competence to gatekeepers.
My results conﬁrm the basic intuition that audiences prize nov-
elty when they simultaneously see the producer as high-status and
creatively competent. However, they suggest that high status does
not necessarily trigger perceptions of creative competence. It may
doso inartisticwork,whereaudiencesnormally assume thathighly
innovative output is a preconditionof professional prominence. But
in knowledge production, where prominence may also be attained
whiledoing routine, normal-sciencework, theperceptionsof status
and creative competence are causally unbundled. The connotation
of the author’s creative competence must be added to perceptions
of status for the audiences of knowledge to reward novelty in the
author’s work. Without this added connotation, status may fail to
affect the rewards of novelty or even reduce them.
The results of the study enrich our understanding of the func-
tion of mentoring relations in professional communities. While the
mentoring literature has focused on the functions of mentoring
relations for the mentors and their protégés, this study highlights
the informational function ofmentoring for observerswho have no
apparent stake in thementoring relationathand. Theﬁndings show
that, in granting professional recognition to producers of knowl-
edge, the audience may consider not only their mentors’ easily
visible status markers such as prestigious awards but also more
nuanced information, such as the extent of novelty of the mentors’
work.
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10.2. Practical implications, limitations, and future directions
The study’s simple practical message to scientists who seek
audience recognition is that they have a better chance to succeed
if they visibly commit to novel rather than incremental, normal-
science work. By seeking out mentors known for divergent ideas or
building up a record of novel contributions, authors communicate
to the audience that they are committed to specializing in high-
novelty work. The practicability of this recommendation certainly
depends on how much awareness scientists have of the novelty of
their ownoutput. This question remainsopen. Itmaybehard for the
scientists to know how novel their own work is in the audience’s
perception, and harder still to control it. Hence, it may also be difﬁ-
cult to strategically pursue recognition for novelty. Future research
examininghowaccurately authors’ ownassessments of thenovelty
of their work correspond to audiences’ assessments may clarify the
feasibility of strategic reputation building.
The other question that this project leaves unanswered is how
recognition of highly novel ideas may be attained early in authors’
careers. We saw that recognition for earlier novelty helps with
recognition of subsequent novelty. But how was the earlier recog-
nition attained? It stands to reason that the author’s previous
professional record also determines early recognition, but the
elements of that record that matter are different from those at
advanced career stages and are more difﬁcult to capture empiri-
cally. For example, reputations of educational establishments may
matter. The role of the author’s personality traits, such as motiva-
tion, may also be considerable at early career stages.
The argument and ﬁndings of this study are generalized to pre-
commercial science and technology; the implications for marketed
products remain largely open. The one evidently straightforward
implication is that novel pre-commercial ideas that beneﬁt from
their authors recognition for novelty have a better chance of
eventual market success, because pre-commercial recognition by
experts helps with subsequent commercialization, particularly by
attracting investors. But does commercial producers’ past recog-
nition affect the appeal of highly novel marketed products to
consumeraudiences?Although thisquestion isoutside thepurview
of this project, the goal is to generate interest in them. An effort to
answer it would engage disciplines that this study did not draw
upon, particularly marketing, and a different type of empirical evi-
dence.
A simple working hypothesis to guide this effort is that, in eval-
uating original, innovative products, consumer audiences are as
much inﬂuenced by the producers’ past record as the knowledge
audiences studied here. The hypothesis would predict that, other
things being equal, producers who have a visible record of novel
products will earn a larger consumer following when they intro-
duce highly innovative, ground-breaking products; conversely,
similar products by producers who have no such record will have
a relatively low consumer appeal. The history of innovation offers
anecdotal evidence consistent with these predictions. For exam-
ple, IBM successfully entered the emerging personal computer (PC)
market in the 1980s, whereas the market was not receptive to
similar PCs produced by the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC).
IBM was famously good at innovating in diverse areas, whereas
DEC had no novelty credentials beyond its increasingly obsolete
minicomputer technology (Christensen, 1997; p. 125–128). The
independent and innovative Facebook quickly dethroned MySpace
in the emerging online social networking sector after the latterwas
acquired by News Corporation, a behemoth of pre-Internet mass
media. Because consumers ever more actively co-create the value
of innovative products (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004), the role
of producers’ public image in determining such contrasts of success
and failure may be increasing relative to the traditionally empha-
sized role of capabilities and management. If so, established ﬁrms
aspiring to introducedisruptive technologieswouldbewell advised
to focus, alongside othermanagement andmarketing efforts aimed
at supporting innovation, on establishing an image as highly cre-
ative innovators.
Explaining the dual effect of novelty on recognition is an ambi-
tious undertaking, and the recognition spillover explanation is not
intended to be exhaustive. The features of the piece of knowl-
edge itself (rather than those of its authors) are an obvious type
of potential explanations not considered here. This study aspires
to stimulate a systematic inquiry into this and other moderators
of the relationship between novelty and audience recognition. By
suggesting one kind of moderators, it highlighted more gaps in our
understanding than it was able to ﬁll.
Appendix A.
Disambiguation of author identities
The Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge (TRWK) database
identiﬁes authors of publications by their last name and all initials
(LNAI) only. It also records the authors’ institutional afﬁliations;
yet, because of inconsistent formats of institutions’ names and the
inconsistent author-institution matching in cross-institutional co-
authorships, institutional afﬁliations cannot be reliably matched to
individuals in TRWKwithoutmanual, case-by-case identity checks.
Matching publications to authors by LNAI generates pervasive and
often irresolvable ambiguity. Authors with ambiguous LNAIs were
therefore removed from the sample.
This appendix describes the criteria that deﬁne ambiguous LNAI
in the study. Each successive criterion of ambiguity was applied
only to cases not deemed ambiguous under preceding criteria.
A.1. Common names
The person’s last name may be too common for reliable identi-
ﬁcation with LNAI. The following categories of cases were ﬂagged
as ambiguous because of common names:
a) Two or more people in the sample of information theorists have
identical LNAI (74 individuals removed).
b) Five or more people in the sample of information theorists have
the same last name. The chance that another author has an
identical LNAI is unreasonably high for individuals with such
common last names (549 additional individuals removed).
c) The person’s last name and ﬁrst initial (LNFI) do not identify
them uniquely among all authors who have published under the
“engineering (electrical & electronic)” category in TRWK (353
additional individuals removed).
A.2. Unrealistic timing of publications
LNAIwas ﬂagged as ambiguous if no publication under this LNAI
falls within the 11-year period centered at the years in which the
corresponding individuals in the sample obtained their Ph.D. (202
additional individuals removed).
A.3. Unrealistic clustering of publications
A recently developed set of methods in information science
uses clustering of publications to disambiguate author identities
(Gurney et al., 2012; Smalheiser and Torvik, 2009). The following
multi-stage clustering algorithm was applied to identify authors
with unrealistic clustering of publications.
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a) Select all publications in TRWK with an LNFI matching the
researcher not ﬂagged in stages 1 or 2 above.
b) Identify relations between the selected publications. Two publi-
cations are related if (1) they have a shared author LNFI, (2) there
are no conﬂicting second or higher initials in the author’s name
in the two publications, and (3) the two publications satisfy at
least one of the following ﬁve criteria:
1) One publication cites the other.
2) The publications have at least three references in common
(bibliographic coupling).
3) The publications have at least three citing publications in
common (co-citation).
4) The publications have at least two author LNFIs in common.
5) The publications both have only one author address and this
address is the same.
c) Identify clusters of selected publications in such a way that all
publications within a cluster are directly or indirectly related,
while there are no relations between publications in different
clusters. (In graph theory, such clusters are called connected
components.)
d) Flag clusters as suspect if any of the following are true:
1) All publications in the cluster are outside the six most-
common TRWK subject areas in which information theory
publications appear: engineering (electrical and electronic);
telecommunications; computer science; information sys-
tems; physics (multidisciplinary); optics; computer science
(artiﬁcial intelligence automation and control systems.
2) Thecluster containsnopublications in theelectrical engineer-
ing category.
3) The cluster has no publications with a perfect LNAI match.
4) The cluster contains at least one publication with incorrect
second or higher initials in the author’s name.
5) The year of the earliest publication in the cluster is more than
eight years before the author’s Ph.D. year.
e) Remove the “suspect” label from a cluster if it contains publica-
tions with a student-advisor match.
f) Flag LNAI as ambiguous if either of the following is true:
1) 80% or more of publications under the author’s LNFI are
in “suspect” clusters of any size (760 additional individuals
removed).
2) The author has more than 10 disconnected clusters of two or
more publications (86 additional individuals removed).
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